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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
W. B. RUSSE:LL, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
THE OGDEN UNION RAILWAY AND 
DEPOT C0~1:P ANY, a corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
As the facts before the lower ·court were, for the 
most part, admitted by the pleadings, or stipulated, 
there is no dispute with respect thereto. As this factual 
situation may be briefly developed, we take the liberty 
of so doing, realizing that to some extent it is repetitious 
of appellant's statement. We refer to the parties as 
they appeared in the lower court, namely, as plaintiff 
and defendant. 
On August 3, 1945, plaintiff was employed as a 
switchman by defendant at its yards in Ogden. He had 
there been so employed for approximately four years. 
His employment was covered by a collective bargaining 
agreement entered into between defendant and the 
Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen, and he was entitled 
to the benefits and subject to the burdens thereof. This 
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collective "I?a.rgaining agreement is in~ evidence as Plain-
tiff;s Exhibit "E". Plaintiff did not return to work 
following the completion of his work day on July 21, 
1946. On July 31 or August 1, 1945, (there being a 
conflict between the pleadings and the evidence) at 
approximately 6:30 o'clock in the morning, defendant 
called plaintiff by telephone and told him that a formal 
investigation. would be held by defendant that day at 
2 :00 o'clock p. m. concerning his violation of the col-
lective bargaining agreement by being absent without 
leave for a period of over ten days. At plaintiff's re-
quest the time of the investigation and hearing was 
continued and on August 2, 1945, plaintiff was notified 
by defendant to appear on August 3, 1945, at 9:00 A. ~I. 
for hearing upon such charge. 
On August 3, 1945, the hearing was held in the 
offices of the defendant company, and conducted by Mr. 
H. Caulk, defendant's Assistant Superintendent. The 
complete hearing was reported by Mr. Caulk's clerk, 
and transcribed. The only witness called at such hear-
ing was plaintiff and his statement was made primarily 
pursuant to questions propounded by Mr. Caulk. The 
transeript of the hearing "ra.s received in evidence in 
this cause as Plaintiff's Exhibit'' A''. As it is relatively 
short, and as it is of importance to at least some 
phases of this appeal, we set it out in full. 
''Transcript of formal investigation conducted 
in office of Assistant Superintendent OUR&D 
Co. 9· AM August 3, 1945, in connection with 
Switchman W. B. Russell being absent from duty 
over 10 days without leave of absence in violation 
of B.R.T. Sehedule Rule 55 B. 
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Offic_ers Present : 
H. Caulk, Ass't Supt. OUR&D Co. Conducting 
b 1nptoyees Interrogated: 
W. B. Ruseell, S\vitchmru1, OUR&D Co. 
Representatives of Emp-loyes: 
J. B. Hudgens, Representing W. B. Russell 
Reported by : 
J. E. U. Burton, Clerk to Ass 't Supt, 
OUR&D Co. 
Questions by: 1ll r. Caulk: 
Staten~ents of lv·. B. Russell: 
Q Mr. Russell this in an investigation relative· 
you being. absent from duty over 10 days 
without leave of absence in violation of BRT 
Rule 55 B. Do you w1sh a representative. 
A Yes sir, Mr. Hudgens. 
Q State your name, occupation and home ad-
dress. / 
A W. B. Russell, Switchman, 933 Ogden Canyon. 
Q How long have you been employed by the 
OUR&D Co. 
A August 28 will be 4 years. 
Q Do you know the rule that you will not absent 
yourself from duty 10 days or over without 
written leave. 
A Yes sir. 
Q Why didn't you obtain written leave. 
A Because I was sick in bed at the time. 
Q Why didn't you ask the office for leave of 
absence. 
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A I called just as soon as I got out of bed,. soon 
as they called me and told me I was over it. 
Q What other business are you engaged in that 
you cannot work for the Depot Co. 
A None of my own. 
Q Are you working any place else. 
A No. 
Q I understand you own a Club up the canyon. 
A No. 
Q You work up there don't you. 
A Yes. No. 
Q Do you know how many days you have worked 
this year. 
A Yes I do. 
Q It hasn't been very many has it. 
A No, I have had more sickness than I have ever 
had in my life, you can go back on my record 
and see. I had measles, was scalded and now 
down with a cold. 
Q You state you have been here four years. 
A Four years August 28th. 
Q And you have never asked for leave at any 
time layed off. 
A Never went over 10 days except when scalded. 
Q You have made it your business to work some 
time in each half. 
A Ye·s. 
Q The fact of matter is. you worked as follows 
during this year. 
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1st half January,. 8 days 
2nd half January, 8 days 
1st half February 7 days 
2nd half February 6 days 
1st half ~!arch 6 days 
2nd half ~larch 6 days 
1st half Ap·ril 2 days 
2nd half April 6 days 
1st half I\Iay 4 days 
2nd half nlay 6 days 
1st half June 1 day 
2nd half June 2 days 
1st half ·July off 11 days injured and worked 
only two days in second half of July since 
you were injured. 
A That is when I layed off sick, I got scalded· 
went to work and layed off sick. 
Q That doesn't relieve you, you could tell us 
you were sick at that time and told them had 
to have leave of absence and could have gotten 
leave at that time. 
A I didn't figure I would be off that much time, 
just had cold when layed off, I have been to 
a doctor. 
Q You haven't worked since have you. 
A No I haven't. I had had more trouble with 
sickness than any time since I have been down 
here. 
Questions by Mr. Hudgens: 
Q While you were sick during this last period of 
time were you attended by Co. doctor. 
A Yes, Dr. Stratford. 
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· Q And you talked to . tr~in desk before the ex-
p~ration of your 10 days. 
A No. They called me on the 31st, they called 
me out of bed at 6 :.30 AM and told me to be 
here for investigation and I was too sick and 
couldn't make it. 
Q Do you have a. release from the doctor. 
A No, I am still under his care. 
Transcript correct: 
s/9 J. E1. 0. Burto-n'' 
I have read the above and it is 
correct: 
/s/ Wm. B. Russell 
W. B. RUSSELL 
On August 4, 1945, defendant dismissed plaintiff 
from its service, assigning as its reason therefor that 
plaiutiff had been absent from his employment for a 
period of over ten days in violation of Rule 55 (h). 
Rule 55 (h) for the asserted violation of which plaintiff 
was so discharged~ is as follows: 
''Yardmen taking leave of absence for a 
period of over ten days must secure and fill out 
Form 153 so the leave will he covered as a matter 
9f record.'' 
On January 14, 1946, and within a p·eriod of six 
months from the date of discharge, pJaintiff filed with 
defendant written objections to his dismissal, and re-
quested reinstatement. (Exhibit "B"). On January 
22, 1946 defendant, through its Superintendent, re-
affirmed the dismissal, saying: (Exhibit C) 
6 
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January ·22, 1946 
''nir. J. B. Hudgens, Local Chairman 
S"itehmen's Union of North America, Lodge 
No. :279 
804 - 7th Street 
Ogden, Utah 
Dear Sir: 
Referring to your letter of Jan. 14, 1946 
making claim for reinstatement, with pay, favor 
S\Yitchman W. B. Russell \vho was dismissed from 
service Aug. 4, 1945 for being· absent in excess 
of 10 days without written leave of absence: 
The rules require yardmen to have a written 
leave to be absent from duty 10 days or more. 
Russell failed to do this, and it is my position 
that the action taken in his case is fully justified. 
Claim is therefore respectfully declined. 
Yours truly, 
/s/ R. E. Edens'' 
On February 15, 1946, Mr. C. E. McDaniels, Acting 
Vice President of Switchmen's Union of North America, 
presented to 1Ir. F. C. Paulsen, Vice President of the 
defendant company what in effect was a petition for 
review by Mr. Paulsen of Mr. Edens' reaffirmance of 
the dismissal. (Plaintiff's Exhibit "D"). This was 
supplemented by a communication from 1\tir. ~fcDaniels 
to Mr. Paulsen dated April 1, 1946. (Defendant's Ex-
hibit 4). On May 14, 1946, 1\tir. McDaniels further wrote 
Mr. Paulsen (Defendant's Exhibit 3), and as the de-
fendant claims much in his brief for this particular 
communication, we set it out in fulL 
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.. ''Offi~e of Acting Vice President 
134 Cleveland A venue 
Salt Lake City 4, Uta.h 
May 14, 1946 
Mr. F. C. Paulsen, Vice President 
Ogden Union Railway and Depot Co. 
10 South Main Street File OUR&D-3 
Dear Sir: 
Reference is made to our conference·, your 
office, May 7, 1946, in connection with your file 
011.221 attached to our grievance, reading: 
'Claim for reinstatement, with seniority 
rights unimpaired, and compensation at the 
applicable rate, August 6, 1945 and each SUB-
SEQUENT date thereto until restored to ser-
vice favor switchman W. B. Russell, Ogden 
Yard, account dismissed from the service 
August 4, 1945 for his alleged responsibilty 
i_n connection with unauthorized leave of 
absence' 
in connection with the reinstatement of former 
.switchman W. B. Russell, Ogden, Utah. 
As agreed during our conference, further 
action on the subject matter was to be held in 
abeyance pending our investigation of undesir-
able procedure on the part of Mr. Russ.ell result-
ing in false testimony evidenced during formal 
investigation of August 3, 1945. 
This investigation has been completed and 
it is without prejudice to our contentions and 
position as expressed in our letter of February 
15, 1946 and without establishing a precedent 
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a~ to adjustment of future grievances ·possess-
ing dissimilar facts and circumstances· devolving 
upon similar allegations as appear in the intro-
duction of the formal investig-ation of August 
3, 19±5 \Ye are \Yithdra"'ing- the grievance and 
the case is closed. 
Yours truly, 
/s/0. E. McDaniels 
C. E. ~1cDaniels, Acting Vice 
President, S. U. of N. A. 
PS : Note change in address. 
Phone 7-7 593'' 
Thereafter this action '"·as commenced whereby 
plaintiff sought the judgment of the court for rein-
statement, and damages for all time lost, predicating 
such claim upon his contention that his discharge had 
been wrongful, and upon Section 38 of the collective 
bargaining agreement, reading, so far as here pertinent, 
as follows: 
'' 38. Investigations : No yardman will he sus-
pended or dismissed without first having a fair 
and impartial hearing and his guilt established. 
* * * * * 
In case dismissal is found to be unjust, yardman 
shall he reinstated and paid for all time lost * * *. 
NOTE-Reinstatement will not be permitted 
after the expiration of six months from date of 
dismissal unless agreeable to the managment 
and the general committee, except that a case 
pending with either the B.R.T. or O.R.C. at the 
exp~ir~tion of the six month -p.eriod, will not be 
prejudiced. Where the yardman involved has 
been out of service six months or less it will not 
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~e obliga.tory .to co;nsult the eommittees repre·-. 
se;ntj~g thes~ classes ·of employes in considering 
the case for reinstatement.'' 
Upon ·conclusion of the trial, the court made and 
entered findings of fact, conclusions of law, and its judg-
ment, whereby it determined plaintiff's discharge to 
have been wrongful, denied plaintiff reinstatement, 
but awarded him judgment for all time lost. 
THE NATURE OF THE CASE ON APPEAL 
Inasmuch as the lower court denied to plaintiff 
his prayer for reinstatement, and plaintiff did not appeal 
from that ruling, that phase of the case is not before 
this court. Accordingly, we are at a loss to understand 
why the question of reinstatement is dealt with so exten-
sively by defendant in its brief. 
Actually the only questions here involved are 
(1) Did the lower court commit reversible error in 
its rulings on evidentiary matters; 
(2) Did it commit r-eversible error in denyj.ng 
defendant's motion for non-suit: 
(3) Was it oorrect in concluding that under the facts 
plain tiff's discharge vras wrongful ; 
( 4) Did it apply the correct rule in its dete-rmina-
tion of the dollar amount of recovery to which plain-
tiff was entitled for his wron,gful discharge. 
Defendant contends that the lower eourt was wrong 
on each of the matters, and that we, as pl~aintiff's coun-
sel, pawned off on the lower cour.t a ''bill of goods''. 
We naturally resent the implication thus embodied in 
10 
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the defendant\~ characterization ·of our efforts on be-
half of the plaintiff, and submit that is is wholly unjust-
ified. EYery proposition urged by us in the lo,ver 
court "~as and is supported by la"y' and that the lower 
rourt 's acceptance of our position was correct under 
the law ".,.e shall no'Y demonstrate. In so doing· we shall 
ans,Yer defendant's contentions point by point, and in 
the order presented in defendant's brief. 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN 
ADMITTING THE TRANSCRIPT OF THE 
PROCEEDING AT THE OFFICIAL INVESTI-
GATION AS SUBSTANTIVE EVIDENCE OF 
THE. FACTS THEREIN STATED. 
At the outset it may be advisable to make some 
comment with respect to the decisions of the Supreme 
Court of the United States relative to the jurisdiction 
of state courts to hear and decide actions such as this. 
The first is Moore v. Illinois Central Railway Co., 312 
U. S. 630, 85 L. Ed. 1089, 61 S. Ct. 754. In this case it 
was categorically held that a state court had jurisdic-
tion to determine an action for damages by an indivi-
dual against a railroad for breach of a collective bar-
gaining agreement. 
The ~Ioore case was followed by Slocum v. Dela-
ware, Lackawanna & Western Railroad, 338 U. 8. 229, 
94 L. ed. 535, 70 8. Ct. 577; Order of Railway Conduc-
tors v. Southern Railw~ay Co., 339 U. 8. 255, 94 L. ed. 
542, 70 8. Ct. 585; and Order of Railw~ay Conductors 
v. Pitney, 326 U. 8. 561, 90 L. ed. 318, 66 S. Ct. 322. These 
cases differed from the Moore case in that whereas in 
11 
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the Moore case an individual was suing for breach of 
the agreement, in the other three cases the actions were 
between the unions and the carriers se·eking judicial 
interpretations of collective bargining agreements. In 
the Slocum and Southern Railway cases, actions were 
brought for declaratory judgments interpreting the 
agreements; the Pitney case was a jurisdictional dis-
pute involving the railroad and two unions. The Su-
preme Court in each case held that interpretations of 
collective bargaining agreements of the character there 
sought la.y with the Adjustment Board under the Rail-
way Labor Act, and not with the courts, but in so hold-
ing it did not distrub its decision in the Moore case to 
the effect that an individual might seek recourse in the 
courts for personal redress for breach by a carrier of a 
collective bargaining agreement. In fact the Moore 
case was specifically reaffirmed. In this connection 
the Supreme Court in the Slocum case said: 
''Our holding here is not inconsistent with 
our holding in Moore v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 312 
U. 8. 630, 83 L. E·d. 1089·, 61 8. Ct. 754. Moore 
was discharged by the railroad. He could have 
challenged the validity of his discharge before 
the Board, seeking reinstatement and hack pay. 
Instead, he· chose to accept the railroad's action 
in discharging him as final, thereby ceasing to 
he an employee, and brought suit claiming dam-
ages for breach of c~ntract. As we there held, 
the Railway Labor Act does not bar courts from 
adjudicating such cases. A common-law or sta-
. tutory action for wrongful discharge differs from 
any remedy which the Board has power to pro-
vide, and does not involve questions of future 
relations between the railroad and its other em-
ployees. If a court in handling such a case must 
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consider some proYISlon of a collective-bargain- · 
ing' agreement, its interpretation "'ould of course 
h::;.\·e no binding- effeet on future interpretations 
by the Board.'' 
Personally, '"e do uot believe there is any dis-
agreement bet\veen counsel for defendant a~nd our-
selYes on this point, although "'e do eonceive a disagree-
ment as to the jurisdiction of a state court in the mat-
ter of reinstatement, and, it is perhaps well to pinpoint 
our Yie,Ys on that matter as it may have some bearing 
on the question of the measure of recovery, although 
the question of reinstatement itself is not before this 
court. 
\\?' e understand it to be counsel's position that 
while a state court has jurisdiction to entertain an in-
dividual's suit for damages for breach of a. collective 
bargaining agreement, it has no jurisdiction to order 
reinstatement, and counsel derives its comfort for this 
position from the decisions of the Supreme Court of 
the United States, sup·ra. We submit, however, that 
such point was neither involved nor so decided in any 
of such cases. It was at one time in the Moore case, as 
an examination of the history of that case discloses, and 
its disposition is interesting . 
.1\Ioore first brought an action against the Yazoo 
&]}J. V. R. Co. and Illin.ois Central Railroad Co., 166 
So. 395, in connection with his seniority rights, claim-
ing that the carrier had wrongfully assigned him num-
ber 57 instead of 37. The Supreme Court of Mississippi 
dismissed his action, holding that by failing timely to 
protest his seniority assignment, and accepting work 
13 
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assignments thereunder, he had waived his right to in-
voke the a~d of the court. The significant part of the 
decision is that it is predicated upon a waiver of rights 
and nowhere does the court suggest that in the absence 
of such waiver it was without power to aid him. 
Later Moore was discharged from service for ''un-
satisfactory conduct'', and following such discharge 
brought an action for damages for wrongful discharge 
under the collective bargaining agreement. This action 
was brought in the courts of Mississippi, was removed 
to the federal court, and ultimately reached the Supreme 
Court of the United States. M a ore v. Illinois Central 
Ra.ilroad Co., Supra. It involved no question of rein-
statement or seniority; as his earlier case did. It was 
therein definitely settled that the courts had jurisdic-
tion of his individual claim under the collective bar-
gaining agreement, and if any implication is to be drawn 
therefrom it is that the court, having jurisdiction to 
adjudicate his rights to damages under the contract, 
likewise had jurisdiction to adjudicate his right to rein-
statement under the- contract had he sought reinstate-
ment in his action. 
Other cases may he cited which, while not strictly 
on all fours with the factual situation in the present 
case, indicate the power of the courts to deal with the 
question of reinstatement as· well as with the monetary 
recovery to which a wrongfully discharged employee 
may be entitled. Thus, in the case of Fine v. Plat (Tex.) 
150 S. W. (2nd) 308, it was held that a seniority right 
is a contract rig·ht which will be .protected by the court, 
and that the court had power to require specific per-
formance of an agreement fixing the plaintiff's seniority 
rights. 
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In tlle case of Heasley v. Plasterers' Local No. 31, · 
(Pa.) 188 .A.tlanti.c 286, in w'hich it 'vas held that the 
court had jurisdiction to compel reinstatement, the 
court 'Yent on to say that the right to contract for work 
is a property right, and the court has the power to res-
train its impairment. 
In the case of Locomative Engineers v. M·i!lls, (Ariz.) 
31 Pacific (~) 971 the Supreme Court of Arizona said 
that an interference with a man's livelihood is suffi-
cient to give a court jurisdiction as such an illegal act 
amounts to interference with a visible property right. 
In that case the court took jurisdiction to pre~ent the 
interference with a railway employee's seniority as 
against the contention that such seniority was not a 
property right granted to and vested in the individual. 
Finally, in the case of Coyle v. Erie Ra.ilro.ad Com-
pany (N. J.) 59 .AtlOJntic (2) 817, which case involved 
an action brought for reinstat~ment and for wages lost 
as a result of an improper discharge, the court ordered 
the plaintiffs reinstated to their former positions with . 
the employer, with their seniority rights. unimpaired a.s 
well as back pay from the time of their dismissal to 
the time of their reinstatement 
We unduly labor the point, howeiVer, as the court 
in this case denied reinstatement. 
To return now to the specific point involved under 
this heading, namely, the admissabilty as substantive 
evidence of the transcript of the hearing which resulted 
in plaintiff's discharge. In considering this matter it 
must be borne in mind that the parties had a written 
contract covering the employment, and this contract 
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dealt specifically with the matter of :plaintiff's dis-
charge-. The first sentence of Rule 38 provided: 
''No yardman will he suspended or dismissed 
without first having a fair and impartial hearing 
and his guilt established." (Italics added) 
That the last phrase relates to the hearing neces-
sarily follows. In other words, before the plaintiff 
might properly be discharged, charges of misconduct 
must be· brought against him, he must have a fair and 
impartial hearing on such charge, and his guilt of the 
offense charged must he estabHshed at the hearing. 
Anything less would he a mockery. If he might be dis-
charged ·for matters other than those involved in the 
charge, or if his guilt as to the charge might be deter-
mined other than as a result of the hearing, the provision 
for a fair and impartial hearing becomes meaningless. 
Therefore. we submit, the contract itself pro-
vides that as a condition to proper dismissal a charge 
must be brought, a fair and impartial hearing had on 
the charge, and his guilt of the charge established at 
the hearing. 
Now what is· the best evidence as to whether (1) a 
charge was made; ( 2) a fair and impartial hearing 
on the charge had; and (3) guilt of the charge estab-
lished wt the hearing. The answer is obvious. It is the 
record of the hearing itself, and that is what was intro-
duced in evidence, and what defendant now complains 
of. The re.cord of the hearing shows on its face that 
it was taken and prepared by defendan~t's own repre-
sentatives, and eounsel for defendant stipulated that 
such record (Exhibit "A") constituted a complete 
transcript of the hearing. ( Tr. 5). 
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Thi~ is by no means tl1e case of Ten~nison. ·v. St .. 
Lou-is-San Fra·ucisco Ry Co., ____________ ]J:] o·--------~---, 228 S. 
lV. (~) 713, relied upon by defendant. In that case the 
contractnral pro,Tision \vas: 
'·Trainmen shall not be suspended, discharged, 
or unfavorable entries made against their re-
cords \\yl.thout just and sufficient cause". 
The court, in construing this provision said: 
'·What the contract provided was that trainmen 
would not be discharged 'without just and suffi-
cient cause'. ~Iethods were provided for a full 
investigation of charges and hearing of the em-
ployee's side before action. However, defend-
ant is no more precluded thereby for litigat-
ing in court the issue of ' just and sufficient 
cause' than is plaintiff. Both may bring in any 
competent evidence they have and object to any 
incompetent evidence; and there is no estoppel 
against defendant because Foster was heard at 
the investigation required by the contract.'' 
In other words, the crux of the matter was whether 
there was in fact "just and sufficient cause" for the 
discharge, and whether such just and sufficient cause 
did in fact exisf was a matter to be determined by the 
court on competent evidence there presented; that an un-
sworn statement of one not a party to the litigation was 
hearsay, and not admissible. 
Here the contraotural provision is : 
''No yardman will be suspended or dismissed 
without first having a fair and impartial hearing 
and his guilt established.'' 
17 
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In the Tennison case the right of proper discharge 
was predicated upon the existence of ''just and sufficient 
cause''. Such ''just and sufficient cause'' might exist 
independe:nt of any hearing, and, if it did in fact exist, 
would justify dismissal. 
In our case, the right to proper discharge is condi-
tional upon a hearing and the establishment of guilt at 
the hearing. Just and sufficient cause in our case is not 
sufficient. Our contract conditions the right to dis-
charge upon the establishment of guilt at the hearing. 
Thus, we say that there is no relationship between the 
Tennison case and ours. 
The same is true as to the second case relied on by 
defendant, namely, Johnson v. ThompBon, ____ . ____ M o·--------, 
236 S. W. (2) 1. In that case the contractural provision 
was: 
''Any conductor may he suspended from duty 
for a reasonable time, or for investigation of any 
alleged misconduct, or for viola;tion of rules or 
orders, and may be discharged from the service 
of the company for good and sufficient causes. 
* * * 
Thus, in the Johnson case the court held that the 
question it was trying under the contract was whether 
''good and sufficient cause'' for discharge existed. In 
our case the question under the contract was whether 
plaintiff's guilt of the charge against him had been 
established at his hearing. The distinction between the 
two is vital, and plaintiff's rights under the contract 
must not be lightly discarded. Here the defendant 
agreed that plaintiff might not be discharged unless 
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certain conditions were established. Because other con-
tracts in1pose milder conditions upon other carriers is 
not here our concern. 
Defendant's position simply is that irrespective of 
"~hat deYeloped at the hearing-, evidence thereof was 
inadmissable. .A . .11 assumption 'vill demonstrate the fal-
lacy of this reasoning-. Let's assume that at the hear-
ing· it "~as conclusively established that plaintiff was 
not in fact absent ·without leave for a period in excess 
of ten days, yet defendant nevertheless discharged him 
for violation of that rule. Under those circumstances 
could it be suggested that the record of that hearing, 
which thus conclusively established plaintiff's inno-
cence of the charge, could not he admitted in evidence 
of the fact that his guilt had not been established at the 
hearing1 Such is in fact our case. The record of the 
hearing was offered solely for the purpose of proving 
that at the hearing plaintiff's guilt had not been estab-
lished. The establishment of his guilt was a condition 
to defendant's right of discharge, and the reception in 
evidence of the record of the hearing was, accordingly, 
proper. 
The situation here is not dissimla.r from that exist-
ing with respect to determinations by administrative 
bodies generally. Whether such bodies in acting upon 
matters within the scope of their authority acted arbit-
rarily or capriciously, and \Vhether a fair hearing was 
had, is to be determined by the court in the light of the 
record of the hearing. In the instant case the transcript 
of the hearing conclusively shows that guilt was found 
by the defendant without a scintilla of evidence to sup-
port such finding. Thus it is that defendant finds it 
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necessary not only to ·seek to suppress the record of the . 
hearing it held, and following which it acted, but also 
to justify the action it took by other alleged acts of mis-
eonduct which were neither the subject of the hearing, 
nor then a.ssigned by the defendant a.s grounds for plain-
tiff's discharge. 
POINT ii 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT 
RIDVERSIBLE ERROR IN REFUSING TO 
GRANT DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR NON-
SUIT. 
The answer to this point of argument is obviously 
simple. Plaintiff had a prima facie case for recovery 
upon the basis of the pleadings and stipulation alone. In 
other words, it was admitted and stipulated that plain-
tiff had been employed by defendant; that his employ~ 
ment was covered by the collective bargaining agree-
ment; that defendant had discharged him; that but for 
the discharge he -could have worked for defendant; and 
that as a, result of his discharge his earnings from de-
fendant had been lost to him. It was further admitted by 
the parties that under the c.ollective bargaining agree-
ment defendant's right to discharge was limited by the 
provisions of Rule 38. Under those circumstances the fact 
of disc.ha.rge alone made out a prima facie case for re--
covery. . The burden was then on the defendant to estab-
lish that the discharge was in accordance with the eon-
tract. 
Defendant's own case of Johnson v. Thompson, 
supra, affirms this proposition. In it the- court said: 
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~' 1'h~ contract of employment \va.s admitted in 
this case and the terms thereof, that is, that 
derea~t'd '"as employed as conductor by defend-
ant in continuous employment. Under the ple·ad-
ings it '""as admitted that deceased was discharged 
from his employment June 12, 1948, by the de-
fendant, for alleged Yiola.tion of its rules. Unde-r 
interrogatories allS"\Vered by defendant, evidence 
as to the loss of earnings "\vas sho,vn. The facts 
further offered by plaintiff show that the 
deceased offered to continue his €mployment but 
that such employment was refused. We think 
this evidence made a prima facie case. The justi-
fication of the discharge was affirmatively 
pleaded in defendant's answer and the burden of 
e-stablishing this defense was upon the defend-
ant." 
In addition, however, to these admissions and sti-
pulations, which in and of themselves made out a prima 
facie case, there was before the court at the· time the 
motion for non-suit was made, the transcript of the hear-
ing upon 'Yhie-h plaintiff's discharge was predicated, and 
which transcript showed on its face that plaintiff had 
not wilfully or otherwise violated the rule he was charged 
with having broken. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN LIMIT-
ING THE EVIDENCE ON THE QUE.STION OF 
WHETHER OR NOT DE·FENDANT HAD 
BREACHED THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
AGREEMENT SOLE~Y UPON THE TRANS-
CRIPT OF THE UNSWORN TESTIMONY 
GIVEN AT THE OFFICIAL INVESTIGATION; 
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IN REFUSING TO ADMIT EiVIDENCE PROF-
FERED BY THE DEFE.NDANT TO SHOW 
JUSTIFICATION FOR PLAINTIFF'S DISMIS-
SAL; AND IN REFUSING TO PERMIT THE 
DE<FENDANT TO PROVE THAT PLAINTIFF'S 
TESTIMONY CONTAINED IN SAID TRANS-
C·RIPT WAS FALSE. 
We have heretofore demonstrated under Point I 
hereof the correctness of the lower court's ruling in 
admitting in evidence the transcript of the hearing as 
hearing upon whether or not the defendant's discharge 
of plaintiff came within the contractural limitations 
thereon; that is, as bearing upon the question of whether 
plaintiff's guilt of the offense with which he was charged 
was established at the hearing. We now have before 
us the question of whether the court should have re-
ceived other evidence tending to establish justification 
for plaintiff's discharge upon other grounds. 
Stated another way, was the trial court limited in 
its determination of the propriety of plaintiff's dis-
charge to a consideration of the hearing actually had, 
or could it consider other grounds the defendant might 
have had for discharging defendant, but as to which no 
charge was ever made or hearing had. 
The specified charge· against plaintiff was that he 
had absented himself in excess of ten days without 
leave. This, and no other matter, was the subject of the 
hearing, and upon this ground, and no other, was he 
discharged. 
It is further to be noted that nearly five months 
-after the initial dismissal this alleged absence without 
written leave was still the only ground relied up-on by 
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defendant as justify·i·ng the charge. vVe invite atten-
tion to thL) h_~t ter of defendant·~ superintendent, R. E. 
Edens. llated Jauunry ~~' l~l-l-;) (Plaintiff's Exhibit 
~' C ''), hereinbeforL) set out in full herein. In rejecting 
plaintiff~~ request for rein~tntement "\Yith pay Mr. Edens 
said: 
· ·l,he rules require yardmen to have a written 
leaYe to be absent from duty 10 days or more. 
Russell failed to do this, and it is my position 
that the action taken in his case is fully justified. 
Claim is therefore respectfully declined.'' 
It "~as not until after this action was brought that 
defendant realized that its original ground for dis-
charge, confirmed some five months later, could not 
successfully "\Yithstand the scrutiny of the courts, and 
that it then began to cast about for some other basis upon 
which to justify its action. And so at the trial the de-
fendant offered to prove as justification for plaintiff's 
dismissal, not his violation of this rule, but 
(1) That he was but an intermittent worker, and 
thus unsatisfactory; 
(2) That in truth and in fact plaintiff was not sick 
during the period in question, but physically 
able to work; and 
(3) That in testifying as he did at the hearing that 
he was sick, when in truth he was well, he had 
lied. 
Several items of evidence were offered, but we believe 
they all come within one or the other of the above three 
categories. 
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Let'-s consider the second category first; ·that i'3, 
that plaintiff was in fact able to work during the period 
in question. 
Wbether or not he w.as sick was a subject for in-
quiry a.t the hearing had on August 3, 1945, as that con-
stituted plainti~f 's excuse for his absence from work. 
However, instead of developing that subject to its satis-
faction at that time, defendant elected to accept the 
testimony of plaintiff himself with respect thereto. No 
continuance was requested by defendant to meet plain-
tiff's testimony in this regard. 
Nor could it contend, nor does it, that it was ~aken 
by surprise. at the hearing as to the reason assigned by 
plaintiff for his absence, i. e. that he was sick. On July 
31st, or August 1st, (as the case may be) defendant's 
representatives talked with plaintiff by phone, and were 
at that time informed by plaintiff that his illness was 
such that he could not that dav attend the scheduled 
ol 
hearing. Defendant, therefore, was fully informed as 
t.o the reasons assigned by plaintiff for his absence, and, 
during the two or three day interim between the date of 
this phone- call and the hearing, had every opportunity 
to procure and present at the hearing such evidence 
as it might have, (including the testimony of its own 
doetor Stratford, whom plaintiff had consulte-d relative 
to his illness) tending to contradict plaintiff's testimony 
that. the reason for his absence- was his illness. But 
instead of so doing defendant was content with the testi-
mony as introduced, closed its hearing on that testimony, 
and discharged plaintiff on the basis thereof. 
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Let's reverse the situation and see \vhere it lea~s, 
because any rule in this regard must of necessity work 
both \Ynys. 
Let·~ assume that plaintiff \Yns silent at the hear-
ing, and that the eYidence adduced thereat by his em-
ployer 'vas adequate to establish his guilt, and based 
thereon he \Yas discharged. He then brought an action 
for "~rongful di~r.harge, and in response to his em-
ployer's reliance upon the eYidence adduced at the hear-
ing- he then urged upon the court other evidence tend-
ing to disprove that "~hich 'Yas established at the hear-
ing;. Is the court to be permitted to try that question 
over ag·ain, and determine as a result of such new hear-
ing that the discharge was improper and thus hold the 
employer liable for wrongful discharge~ Or will the 
court say, ''No, you had your hearing, and full oppor-
tunity to develop the evidence you now seek to introduce. 
The defendant, iu discharging you, was entitled to rely 
thereon., and you will not now be permitted to go beyond 
that 'Which 1_,0as there presented.'' 
We submit that in equity and justice under a con-
tract such as this neither party may go beyond the 
hearing. Each party must present his case in full 
thereat, or be foreclosed. At the conclusion of the hear-
ing the parties' rights and responsibilities are fixed, 
and they may safely chart their future course in the 
light of ·w·hat the hearing established. 
Now, as to categories (1) and (3); namely, that 
plaintiff was but an intermittent worker, and thus 
generally unsatisfactory, and that plaintiff testified 
falsely at the hearing. What we have heretofore said 
as to the conclusiveness of the hearing in fixing rights 
25 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
and responsibilities is here applicable. Further than 
that, we say that the contract itself does not permit a 
hearing upon one alleged ground for dis·charge, a dis-
charge upon that ground, and then a justification for 
the discharge upon some other ground. 
The- contract provides that before a covered em-
ployee may be discharged, an offense must be charged 
and a hearing had thereon. The contract does not per-
mit a man to be discharged upon one ground, and then 
justification for the discharge had upon some other 
ground as to which he has had no opportunity to he 
heard. 
Under a contract such as this a proper discharge 
may not be had without a hearing, nor may a discharge 
he supported upon grounds other than those stated in 
the specific charge. In Kiker v. Insurance Company, 
(N. M.) 23 P. (2) 366. the court said: 
''Generally, in an action for wrongful dis-
charge, the employer may plead in defense any 
sufficient cause·, though it may have been un-
knoWn to him at. the time, though his real rea-
son or motive may have been something else, 
arid though another cause may have been expres-~ 
·sly ·as-signed. Williston on Contracts, Sec. 7 44, 
839; La batt ·on Master and Servant, Sec. 187; 
Page on Contracts (2d Ed.), Sec. 3058; 19 R. C. 
L. 516; 39 C. J. 89. 
''But the parties of course have the right to 
stipulate the maner in which the employer may 
terminate the contract. If they stipulate that 
it shall be by written notice sp·ecifying the cause, 
a discharge specifying no cause, or an insuffi-
cient cause, would be wrongful. It follow'S that, 
26 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
under such a contract, a ca,use not ~pecified would. 
not be arailable in defense. Hughes v. Gross et 
al, 166 ~Jas~. 61, 43 N. E. 1031, 3~ L. R. A. 620, 
55 Am. St. Rep. 375, cited; 18 R. C. L. 516, 1\tlor-
timer v. Bristol, 190 App,. Div. 452, 180 N. Y. S. 
55.'' 
In ('~ole v. Lowe's, Inc., Inc., 8 Fed. Rules Dec. 508, 
the court said : 
''Where the contract specified grounds for 
termination or suspension and written notice 
is provided for, the employer, in order to justify 
his action, must show that the ground given in 
the notice actually existed. He cannot justify 
his action on other grounds named in the con-
tract, which, although true, were not stated in 
the notiee. '' 
And in Levy v. Jaratt, (Tex) 198 8. W. 333, the 
court said: 
"If the acts of misconduct other than plan-
ning to enter business for himself now charged 
aginst the plaintiff would have justified his dis-
charge, they were not made the basis of the term-
inition of the contract and could not affect the 
plaintiff's right to recover on it, as the defend-
ant at that time did not treat such acts as being 
a breach of contract. * * *." 
Thus, we respectfully submit as the contract calls 
for a charge, a hearing, and the establishment of guilt, 
as conditions to discharge, the employer cannot justify 
a discharge on grounds other than those embodied in 
the charge and made the subject of the hearing. As 
that is what the proffered testimony was directed to-
ward, the lower court was correct in excluding it. And 
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we cannot conceive that any carrier, operating under 
con tracts such as this, would consciously want the pre-
cedent established that a court, in trying the question 
of wrongful discharge, might go beyond the evidence 
adduced at the hearing itself. For under such a prece-
dent, as heretofore pointed out, an employee might stand 
silent a.t the hearing, permit himself to be discharged, 
and then in a subsequent action for damages, prove to 
the court by evidence that he should have presented at 
the hearing that he was innoc.ent of the charge upon 
which he was dismissed. 
POINT IV 
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT COMMIT 
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN ASSESSING .A.ND 
FIXING DAMAGES: 
(A) IN RE:FUSING TO ALLOW AS MITIGA-
TION OF DAMAGES THE AMOUNT OF 
MONEY EARNED BY THE PLAINTIFF IN 
OTnER EMPLOYMENT BETWEEN THE 
DATE OF HIS DISMISSAL BY THE 
DEFENDANT AND THE DATE OF TRIAL; 
(B) IN HOLDING THAT THE MEtASURE 
OF DAMAG-ES FOR BREACH OF THE CON-
TRACT WAS THE AMOUNT PLAINTIFF 
WOULD HAVE EARNED HAD HE WORKED 
EACH AND EVERY DAY AT HIS FORMER 
EMPLOYME1NT WITH THE DEFENDANT 
BETWEEN THE RECIPT BY DEFENDANT 
OF HIS APPLICATION FOR REINSTATE-
MENT AND THE DAY OF TRIAL, SEPTE1I-
BER 7, 1950, A PERIOD IN EXCESS OF FIVE 
YEtt\.R.S; 
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(C) IN REFUSING TO PERMIT THE 
DEFENDANT TO PROVE THAT THE PLAIN-
TIFF DURING HIS E~IPLOYMENT BY THE 
DEFENDANT WORKED ONLY A PORTION 
OF THE TI~lE ALTHOUGH STEADY 
E~IPLOY~IENT WAS AVAILABLE TO HIM. 
(A) Subdivision (a) under this point of argument 
relates solei!~ to the question of 'Yhetber in determining 
the amount of plaintiff's recovery for his wrong·ful dis-
charge, earnings of plaintiff in other employment bet-
"Teen the date of his dismissal and the date of trial are 
to be deducted from the amount he could have earned 
from defendant but for the wrongful discharge. 
In support of its contention that these interim earn-
ings should be deducted, defendant relies upon the gen-
eral proposition, with which we have no quarrel, to the 
effect that the measure of damages for breach of an em-
ployment contract generally is the amount the employee 
'vould have received under the contract, less what he 
has earned during the period. The difficulty with the 
application of this general rule to this particular case 
is that here the parties themselves have specifically 
contracted for the measure of recovery by plaintiff 
from defendant in the event of wrongful discharge. 
Rule 38 of the collective bargaining agreement provides: 
''In case dismissal is found to be unjust, yardman 
shall be reinstated and patid for all time lost.'' 
That the parties are fully competent and have the 
right to contract with respect to the measure of recovery 
in the event of a breach of the contract there can be no 
doubt. Indeed, a provision in an employment contract 
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liquidating th·e: damages in the ev·ent of a breach is 
deemed appropriate. In · 31 Am. J ur. (Labor) Section 
127, it is thus 8tated: 
'~It is not improper in a collective bargaining 
agreement to provide for the payment of liqui-
dated damages in case of breach by the employer 
without also providing for payment of such dam-
ages by the union.'' 
And in 35 Am. Jur. (Master·and Servant) Section 76: 
'' The injury caused by the sudden breaking off 
of a contract of service by either party involves 
such difficulties concerning the actual loss as 
to render a reasonable agreement for stipulated 
damages appropriate.'' 
Defendant's position in this regard is wrapped up 
in the Slocum case, and its statement on page 51 of its 
brief succinctly states its position. This contention of 
defendant as so stated is as follows: 
''The case holds that courts have no jurisdiction 
other than to try a simple common law action 
for damages for breach of contract; that they 
cannot interpret the contract; that they cannot 
pass on the question of whether or not an em-
ployee is entitled to reinstatement, or to any other 
benefits under the contract. They have juris-
diction to decide ( 1) was the contract breached, 
(2) if so, the damages if any, and nothing else. 
And they have absolutely no right to apply any 
other principles in assessing damages than those 
that have always been recognized in courts of law 
in simple contract action.'' 
We now propose to take defendant's position, as 
set forth in its foregoing statement, point by point, and 
show its fallacy. 
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The first proposition is that the Sloeum case holds 
that ''courts have no jurisdiction other than to try a 
simpl~ common-la,v action for damages for breach of 
contract". "re submit that the Supreme Court of the 
United States in the Slocum case made no such holding. 
The language of that court in that case is: 
''We hold that the jurisdiction of the Board (Rail-
way Labor Board) to adjust grievances and dis-
putes of the type here involved is exclusive.'' 
(Italics added) 
The dispute in the Slocum case involved conflicting 
claims between two unions with respect to certain jobs 
with the railroad. The railroad brought an action in 
the state courts of N e'v York for a declaratory judgment 
as to which of the two unions had jurisdiction over 
these jobs. The effect of the Supreme Court's decision 
is simply that in jurisdictional disputes involving col-
lective bargaining agreements, the Railroad Labor 
Board has exclusive jurisdiction. In no wise does the 
court's decision purport, other than in the specified 
instance there involved, to limit the jurisdiction of the 
courts. 
Defendant's second proposition is that under the 
Slocum decision a court is without jurisdiction to inter~ 
pret the collective bargaining agre-ement. The Slocum, 
decision however, says just the contrary. We -again 
quote therefrom: 
''Our holding here is not inconsistent with 
our holding in Moore v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 312 
U. S. 630, 85 L. ed 1089, 61 S. Ct. 764. • * *. As 
we there held, the Railway Labor Act does not 
bar courts from adjudicating such cases. A com-
mon law or statutory action for wrongful dis-
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·charge. differs from -any remedy which the ·Board 
has power to provide and does not involve ques-
. ' t1ons between the railroad and its other em-
ployees. If a court in handling such a case must 
consider some provision of a collective bargain-
itng agreement, its interp·retation would of course 
have no binding effect on future interpretations 
by the Board." (Italics added) 
Thus, 've see that instead of holding that a court is 
without power to interpret provisions of a collective 
bargaining agreement, it specifically reaffirms that in 
actions for wrongful discharge, such as the present 
case, the court must of necessity interpret, and it has 
the power to interpret, the contract as it hears on the 
right of recovery. 
Defendant's next propostion is that under the Slo-
cum decision a court is without power to pass on the 
question of ''whether or not an employee is entitled to 
reinstatement'' or ''to any other benefits under the 
contract''. We do not concede the accuracy of this 
assertion as it relates to ''reinstatement'', but do not 
argue it further as the· problem of reinstatement is not 
here involved. As to the right of the court to inter-
pret the contract in relationship to benefits confe-rred 
upon a.n employee· wrongfully discharged, in an action 
it has before it arising out of such discharge, the deci-
sion is explicit in its affirmance- of that right. 
Defendant's final assertion is that under the Slo-
cum decision courts have "absolutely no right to apply 
any other principles in assessing damages than those 
that have always been recognized in courts of liaw in 
simple contract action". Well, of course, it's obvious 
tha.t the Slocum decision contains no expre-ssion at all 
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in that regard. If a court has jurisdiction to entertrun 
an action for "'Tongful disr.harge~ and there can be no 
question but that it has, the measure of recovery will be 
in acrord 'vith the terms of the contract, and neither the 
la,vs of Utah or of the United States provide. against 
the parties to a contract agreeing to the measure of 
recovery in the eyent of a breach, which is what the 
parties here haYe done. 
\"Ve inYite the attention of the court to its decision 
in the case of Foxley v. Rich, 35 Utah 162, 99 Pacific 
666, as follo,vs: 
·'Where the parties themselves stipulate what 
the result of a breach of a particular contract 
shall be, the courts ordinarily have no authority 
to impose other consequences than those agreed 
upon.'' 
Also, to the case of Rose v. Garn, 56 Utah 533, 19. Pa-
cific 645, as follows : 
''No court has ever held that the parties may not 
agree between themselves as to the measure of 
damages that shall be sustained upon the breach-
ing of a contract by either party." 
And in the concurring opionion to the above case, Mr. 
Justice Frick observed: 
''Parties to a contract, unless prevented by public 
policy or some postive law, have the- same right 
to determine and fix the consequences of a breach 
of the contract that they have to agree upon any 
other proper provision. and, in case they have so 
agreed, courts must enforce their agreement. In 
that regard the -case at bar, in my judgment, falls 
squarely within the rule laid down in the case- of 
Foxley v. Rich, 35 Utah, 162, 99 Pacific 666.'' 
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It remains only for the court to interpret the pro-
visions in the contract 
''In ease dismissal is found to be unjust, yardmen 
. shall be reinstated and p·aid for all time lost," 
Having now, we believe, successfully laid at rest 
any assertion that the Slocum case deprived the court 
of interpreting this provision of the contract, and apply-
ing it in fixing the amount of plaintiff's recovery, we 
give consideration to what it means. The difference 
here between plaintiff and defendant is simple. Plaintiff 
asserts that. it means earnings which otherwise would 
have acerued to him from his employment at the rail-
road, without deductions. Defendant, on the other hand, 
contends that it is such earnings, less interim earnings 
from other sources between the time of discharge and 
trial. 
In support of its position defendant relies upon the 
case of Eubanks v. Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. Co. (Texas) 
59 S. W. 285, decided by the Supreme Court of Texas 
May 3, 1933. In that case the contract provided that 
in the event of wrongful discharge the employee should 
be paid ''for all time lost''. The Texas court, without 
setting forth in its opinion its reasoning in arriving at 
its conclusion, held that this meant that earnings be-
·tween the date of discharge and the date of judgment 
must be deducted. 
That the Texas court in so holding reached what 
we believe to be an erroneous conclusion is evidenced by 
the ruling of the Railroad Labor Board itself on this 
point. In Award No. 13048, Docket No. 22098 of the 
National Railroad Adjustment Board, The Chicago, 
Rock Island and Pacific Railway Oomp·any, decided 
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October ~5, 1949, this particular phrase ''and· paid for 
all time lost'' "·ns carefully and extensively analyzed, 
both from the standpoint of the language of the phrase 
itself in the light of the general rule "-rith respect to miti-
gating damages, and from that of public p·olicy, and its 
conclusion " ... as that earnings from other sources were 
not to be deducted. This "'"as the conclusion reached by 
the lower court in this case. 
In view of the importance of this particular ques-
tion we take the liberty of quoting from the decision of 
the National Railroad Adjustment Board in connection 
with this award. 
''The carrier urges substantially that if the 
claim is to be sustained on account of wrongful 
dismissal the award should be for pay for time 
lost from the carrier less earnings of claimant, if 
any, he made in other employment between the 
time he was discharged and the time reinstated. 
In an approach to a determination of this 
question, it becomes necessary to examine the 
pertinent rule. The rule is Article 23 (d) as fol-
lows: 
'Should such investigation prove the engineer 
unjustly disciplined, it shall be corrected and 
his record cleared; in case the suspension of dis-
missal is found to be unjust, he shall be reinstated 
and paid for all time lost.' 
This provision of the agreement under law 
fixes the rights of the engineer and the liability 
of the carrier in the case of unjust suspension 
or dismissal. 
If the literal ·wording of th!is rule is to be 
accepted it appears that thereby the carrier binds 
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itself to pay an eng~neer unjustly suspended or 
dismissed for all of the time which he lost iln the 
posit~on from w'hich he was removed, and this 
without regard to any question of earnings else-
W'here during the period of separation. To inter-
p·ret it otherwise would be to give the words a 
meaning of which they are clearly not capable. 
If they arH to hH given a different meaning, 
as the carrier insists that they must, that is that 
they must be interpreted to mean that an engineer 
shall be paid for all time lost less such earnings, 
if any, as shall have been received over that 
period from other employment, the reason there-
for must come from some source other than the 
contract itself. 
It is without question the general law of the 
land than an improperly discharged employe is 
required to make the best use of his time to seek 
other employment, and that having done so the 
discharging employer is entitled to have the earn-
ings thereof set off in mitig-ation of the damage 
or against what he was entitled to receive under 
the contract of employment which was breached. 
The carrier substantially contends that this 
general principle of law must be read into thi~ 
provision and become a part of it and that a fail-
ure to do so is contrary to law and public policy. 
No hesitancy is encountered in declaring 
that if the contract was silent, or unexplainably 
ambiguous, or provided that he should be reim-
bursed for his loss as distinguished from his time 
lost, or was couched in any terms othHr than a 
spHcific declaration that he should be paid "for 
all time lost'', the principle contended for by the 
carrier would be applicable and controlling. 
36 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
There is another well reconized principle of 
la"r "yhirh, sinre the agreement is specific in its 
terms, requires consideration here. The prin-
ciple ·ts that parties capable of contracting may 
enter in.fo a contract which is enforceable if it 
relates to a proper subject 1natter, and such a 
conft·act is not condemned as 1J;nenforceable by 
lazp or public policy, e1·en though it contra.venes 
a principle of lan' ord-in.a'rily deemed to be and 
accepted as limitation 1,tpon an ord1:nary contract. 
The principle is one "\Yhich guarantees and pro-
tects the right to freedom of contract in the ab-
senc.e of prohibition of law or of pt1hlic policy. 
The effect of the rule is to say that a contract 
is enforceable .and shall be enforced according 
to its terms unless it runs counter to a prohibi-
tion of law or of public policy. 
Is therefore, the principle for which the car-
rier contends a prohibition in situations such as 
this under law or public policy~ 
Railroad labor relations with which the Ad-
justment Board has power to deal are controlled 
by the laws of the United States. 
No statute of the United States ha.s been 
found which directly or by reasonable implica-
tion prohibits or declares a public policy the effect 
of which is to prohibit enforcement of such con-
tracts as this one in accordance with their speci-
fic terms. 
In some of the state courts and in at least 
one Circuit Court of Appeals of the United States 
the view of the carrier bas been sustained by deci-
. 
SlOn. 
The decisions of the state, courts may be 
said to be controlled in the states where ren-
·37 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
dered put they can lJ.ave no effect upon contracts 
entered into pursuant to the laws of the United 
States. 
As to the decision in the Circuit Court of 
Appeals case, in the light of considerations well 
known to all, it is belived that the declaration 
there, instead of declaring the true public policy 
of the United States with reference to contracts 
such as this one, runs counter thereto. 
The courts do uphold and enforce contracts 
which provide for payment for damage on breach 
in excess of damage sustained, except in those 
jurisdictions wherein there is a prohibition, and 
even in those allo,vance is made as liquidated 
damages if the amount bears a reasonable rela-
tion to the actual damage sustained. As is well 
known particularly in connection with Office 
of Price Administration functioning, the Con-
gress has enacted and dec~ared and the United 
States Courts have approved, instead of con-
demning, a policy of exacting damages in excess 
of the actual damage sustained for entry into 
illegal contracts and for breach of legal con-
tracts. In numerous instances the allowable 
amount was three times the actual damage. 
With this line of legislation and judicial 
determination as an analogy it appears neces-
sary to say that the enforcement of such con-
tracts as this according to their literal terms 
does not offend against the laws of public policy 
of the United States. 
Nothing having been found in the statutes 
of the United States or its public policy which 
prohibits or prevents enforcement of the con-
traot in accordance with its specific terms and 
clear meaning, the finding is that the claimant 
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should be paid for all time lost w~hile he tvas able 
to and co1tld have ~vorked in his assignment with-
out deduction of outside earnin.gs, if any." (Ita ... 
lies added) 
We submit to the court the persuasiveness of the 
reasoning of the Railroad Adjustment Board in reach-
ing the conclusion it did. We also invite the attention 
of the court to that phase of the decision of the Supreme 
Court of the {Tnited States in the Slocum case, supra; 
''The ~ldjustment Board is well equipped to 
exercise its congressionally imposed functions. 
Its members understand railroad problems and 
speak the railroad jargon. Long and varied 
experiences have added to the Board's initial qua-
Ilfications. Precedent's established by it, w·hile 
not necessarily binding, provide opportunities 
for a desirable degree of uniformity in the inter-
pretation of agreements throughout the nation's 
ratilway system." (Italics added) 
(b) and (c). The lower court held that the amount 
of plaintj.ff's recovery was upon the basis of the amount 
that he would have earned if he had worked for defend-
ant every day from ten days ·after his application for 
reinstatement to the date of trial, and declined to con-
sider evidence to the effect that prior to his discharge 
he had not worked steadily. 
It was stipulated and agreed hy the defendant that 
work was available continuously from the date of plain-
tiff's discharge, and that plaintiff's seniority was such 
that but for his discharge he could have worked every 
day from the date he was dismissed to the date of trial. 
Having thus agreed that work was available, and tha.Jt 
plaintiff could have so worked every day, defendant 
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then offered to . prove that during his four years of 
employment he had riot worked every day, and also to 
prove the days during such period he had been absent. 
The purpose of this proof, as stated by counsel for 
defendant, was to establish a pattern from which the 
court might infer that as he had worked less than full 
time prior to his dismissal he would have, worked less 
than full time subsequent thereto. (Tr. 36) 
We submit that the ruling of the lower court was 
proper for two reasons. First, the nature of the offer 
left it entirely too speculative to permit the drawing of 
inferences. Was the reason for his pre-dismissal 
absences due to circumstances within his control, and 
which would continue 1 Were they caused by lo~r s.en-
iori.ty ratings no longer affecting him 1 Were there 
illnesses or accidents responsible 1 In other words, 
c.ould the work history of this man during the first 
four years of his employment in an industry, in which 
seniority plays so important a factor, be of any value 
a.t all in determining the probabilities of t~e amount of 
days he would put in thereafter in the light of' a then 
seniority which would permit him to work every day 
if he so desired. It appears to us, as it appeared to 
the lower court, that the proffered evidence was entirely 
too speculative to be of any value, particularly as the 
mostit would do \vas. to show a. pattern from which the 
court would have to draw inferences. 
The second reason why the rejection of the evidence 
was proper is to be found in the last paragraph of the 
deeision of the Railroad Labor Board in the Chicago, 
Rock Island and Pacific Railway Company case, supra, 
wherein the Board held: 
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~ .. ~~X othing l~aving··been found in the statues 
of the United· Stat~s or- its public policy which 
prohibits or prevents enforeement of the contract 
in accordance 'Yith its specific terms a1Hl c.lear 
meaning, the finding is that the claimant should 
be paid for all time lost 1vhile he was able to and 
could hare lvorked in his assignment without 
deduction of outside earnings, if any." (Italics 
added) 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN 
REFUSING TO ALLOW THE DEFENDANT 
TO PROVE THAT IT WAS POWERLESS TO 
REINST~~TE THE PLAINTIFF IN HIS 
E~IPLOYMENT AFTER THE EXPIRATION 
OF SIX l\IONTHS FROM THE DATE OF DIS-
~IISSAL WITHOUT THE CONSE:NT OF THE 
BROTHERHOOD OF RAILROAD TRAINMEN, 
AND IN EXCLUDING DEFENDANT'S PROF-
FER OF EVIDE:NCE TO SHOW THAT THE 
BROTHERHOOD OF RAJLROAD TRAINMEN 
WAS NEVER AT ANY TIME WILLING TO 
CONSENT TO PLAINTIFF'S RE~INSTATE­
MENT BY THE DEFENDANT. 
A note to Se0tion 38 of the agreement provides in 
part as follows : 
''Reinstatement will not be permitted after 
the expiration of six months from date of dis-
missal, unless agreeable to the management 
and the general committee, * * *.'' 
We're off again on this matter of reinstateme·nt, 
and as the defendant persists in arguing it, we must 
answer in self defense, as we do not want it understood 
that we agree that the foregoing provision of the con-
tract constitutes any present defense to defendant's 
failure to reinstate plaintiff. 
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At the outse~t it should he observed .that the fore~ 
going provisions comes into the agreement as a "Note" 
to the- portion of Rule 38 that immediately precedes it, 
and which relates to the dismissal of yardmen. It is 
obvious that it relates to a rightful dismissal, and not 
a wrongful dismissal. In other words, where an 
employee has been rightfully discharged, he will not be 
reinstaked by the employer without the union's consent. 
The· reason for this is obvious. Upon reinstatement an 
employee assumes his former seniority rating, which 
affeets the seniority status of many other employees. 
Hence, the union naturally wants a voice in the matter 
of such reinstatement. Wby it is tied in to the six 
months period the writer is not informed, but it is to he 
assumed that seniority rights may not be fixed within 
such limited period, and thus a reinstatement within a 
period of six months may not have the adverse effoot 
on other employees that a later reinstatement would 
have. 
But defendant now would extend it to cover a 
wrongful discharge, as well as a rightful one·. In other 
words, that it can wrongfully discharge an employee -
arbitrarily refuse to reinstate him for a period of six 
months - and then escape entirely the consequences 
of its unlawful conduct by smugly asserting that both the 
union and itself are not agreeable to giving the employee 
hack the, job from which he had been wrongfully dis-
missed. We cannot conceive that. any court would coun-
tenance any such course of conduct, nor tha.t this court 
will render any -comfort to the defendant on this ground. 
If this plaintiff was wrongfully discharged, the law and 
the contract has given him his remedy, and it is not to 
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be taken from .hinl by any arbitrary failure of the de-
fendant to reetify the "~rong" 'vi thin the six month's per-
iod. T"To 'vrongs do not inake a right, and if the defend-
ant was wrong in dismissing him in the first instance 
it doesn't make it right by simply refusing to reinstate 
him until after a period of six months has elapsed. 
Further than that, and even if it be assumed that 
the proYision relates to a 'v-rongful discharge:, which 
requires a tortured interp-retation of the word ''dis-
charge'', it is of no avail to the defendant, beeause, if 
such note is actually a part of the contra0t itself, this 
particular provision is of no force or effect. In Piercy 
v. L. & R. Co. (Ky.) 2±8 S. W., 1042, it is held: 
''The primary purpose in the org,anization 
of labor unions and kindred organi~ations is to 
protect their individual members and to secure 
for them a fair a.nd just remuneration for their 
labor and favorable conditions under which to 
perform it. Their agreements with employers 
look always to the securing of some right or pri-
vilege for their individual members, and the 
right or privilege so secured by agreement is the 
individual right of the individual member, and 
such organization can no more by its arbitrary 
act deprive that individual member of his right 
so secured than can any other person. The organ-
iation is. not the agent of the member for the pur-
pose of waiving any personal right he may have, 
but is only his- repres·entative for the limited p·ur-
pose of securing for him, together with all othHr 
members, fair and just wages and good work-
ing conditions. Hudson v. C., N. 0. & T. P. Rail-
way Co., 152 Ky 711, 154 S. W. 47, L. R. A. 
(N. S.) 184. 
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If the right of seniority may be changed or 
waived or otherwise dispensed with by the act 
of a bare majority of an organization, to which 
the one entitled thereto is a member, it would 
be builded upon a flimsy foundation of sand 
which might slip from under him at any time by 
the arbitrary action of the members, possibly 
to serve their own selfish ends in displacing him.'' 
This view was affirmed in the case of System Feder-
ation N~tmber 59 v. Louisiana A. & A. Railw,ay Company, 
119 Federal (2) at page 514. Further, in the case of 
Henry S. Grove, 22 Fed·. (2) 444, it was held that an 
individual cannot he deprived by a union of any sub-
tantive right he has. 
We refer also to the numerous awards of the Rail-
road Adjustment Board and to the eourt decisions cited · 
by defendant in its brief to the effect that the discip-
lining of employees, and the hiring and firing thereof, 
is- the prerogative of management. Defendant can-
not blow hot and cold on this thing a.t the: same time, 
and its now pious protestations that in refusing to rein-
state the pl,aintiff to the position from which he was 
wrongfully discharged constituted ''maintaining the 
integrity of the agreement'' is frivolous. 
However, this all relates to the question of reinstate-
ment, which is not before this court. It was before the 
lower eourt, and that court refused to reinstate. Whether 
the lower court was right or wrong- whether its denial 
was actuated by this argument or some other - is really 
now immaterial. 
POINT VI 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT 
REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT FAILED TO 
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FIXD THAT THE PLAINTIFF WAS WITH-
OUT _A_NY RIGHT TO l\IAINTAIN AN 
_[\.CTION FOR DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF 
THE CONTRACT, OR IF SUCH RIGHT AT 
ANY TI~IE DID EXIST, IN FAILING TO 
FIND THAT PLAINTIFF WAS FORE-
CLOSED AND ESTOPPED FROM ASSERT-
ING THE SAJ\fE. 
Defendant's argument under this p-oint is more 
difficult for us to follow than any that precedes it. 
Apparently two propositions are involved, first, that 
~fr. ~fcDaniels in writing the defendant as he did under 
date of ~lay 1!, 194±, (Defendant's Exhibit 3) in effect 
released the defendant from any liability to plaintiff, 
and, second, if that letter did n-ot cons,ti tute a releas,e, 
plaintiff's failure to prosecute any further claim until 
May 22, 1949, 'vhen this act~on was commenced, effected 
an estoppel. 
This involves the assumption, :Dor the sake of the 
argument, that plaintiff had been wro-ngfully discharged 
and as a consequence h~ad a claim for redress against 
defendant. Upon that assumption we examine the ques-
tion of the effect thereon of Mr. McDaniels' letter of 
May 14, 1946. That letter is as follows: 
134 Cleveland Avenue 
S~alt Lake City 4, U tab 
May 14, 1946 
"Mr. F. C. Paulsen, Vice Preside-nt 
Ogden Union Railway and Depot Co. 
10 South ]dain Street 
Salt Lake City 1, U tab 
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Dear Sir: 
. Reference is made to our conference, your 
office, M~ay, 1946, in connection with your file 
011.221 a~ttached to our grievance, reading : 
'Claim for reins.ta.tement, with seniority 
rights unimpaired, and compensation a.t the 
applicable· rate, August 6, 1945 and each SUB-
SEQUENT d!a.te thereto until restored to ser-
vice favor switchma,n W. B. Russell, Ogden 
yard, account dismissed from the se-rvice 
August 4, 1945 for his. alleged responsibilty in 
connection with unauthorized leave of absence' 
in connection with the reinstatement of former 
switchman W. B. Russ.eil, Ogden, Utah. 
As agreed during our conference, further 
action on the subject matter was to he held in 
aheJJance pending our investigation of undesir-
·ahle procedure on the part of Mr. Russell result-
ing in false testimony evidenced during formal 
investigation of August 3, 1945. 
This investigation has been completed and it 
is dithout prejudice to our contentions and posi-
tion as expressed in our letter of February 15, 
1946, and without establishing a precedent as to 
adjustment of future grievance poss.essing dis-
similar facts and circumstances devolving upon 
similar allegations as appear in the introduction 
of the formal investigation of August 3, 1945 we 
are withdrawing the grievance and the case is 
closed. 
Yours truly, 
PS: Note change in add~ess.. 
Phone 7-7593 
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·/sjC. E:. ~fcDan.iels 
C. E. Mc.Daniels, Acting Vic.e 
President, S. U. of N. A." 
Prior thereto plaintiff had authorized the Switch-
man's union to represent him as his ''agent and repres-
entative in the prosecution of grievance claim'', and to 
act as his '' a.g·ent and representative * * in all further 
prosecution of the * * g-rievance", and to "negotiate, 
adjust and dispose of the grievance claim in any man-
ner". (Exhibit B) 
Defendant's first point is that by virtue of the 
authority vested by Exhibit B, the letter of May 14, 
1946 constituted a release. We disp·ose of that conten-
tion by observing that an effective release requires con-
sideration, and defendant does not suggest. that the let-
ter of May 14, 1946, whatever it may have been intended 
to mean, is supported by any consideration. 
We pass, therefore, to the next question as to 
whether it can he said to be in effect a statement of 
abandonment by plaintiff of his claim for redress., and, 
if so, if pl·aintiff was, on May 22, 1949, when t.his action 
was commenced, estopped from prosecuting his claims. 
As it is contended by defendant that the authoriza-
tion (Exhibit B) operated to constitute the officers of 
the Switchman's Union as plaintiff's agent with authority 
broad enough to cover a.n abandonment of the claim, 
it is well to pause here long enough to consider briefly 
some fundamental principle:S of the law of Agenc:y. The-
fiduciary character of the relations.hip is pointed out 
in 3 C. J. S. (Agency) Section 138, as follows: 
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''As has been pointed out in Section 1 of 
this Title, the relationship existent between 
principal and agent is a. fiduciary one, demand-
ing conditions of tru-st and confidence. Accord-
ingly, in all transactions concerning or affect-
ing the subject matter of his agency, it is the 
duty of the agent to act with the utmost good 
faith and loyalty for the, furtherance and advance-
ment of the inte~rests of his principal.'' 
Now what is the authority of an agent, engaged for 
the purpose of handling a claim for redress, to bind his 
principal by a voluntary ack:n,owledgement that the prin-
cipal has no right to redress. The broadest scope of an 
agency of the type here involved is that which exists 
between attorney and client, and if it he said said that 
this agency was of equal breadth, nevertheless it would 
not and could not encompass the power of retraxit, which 
is the voluntary acknowledgement that plaintiff has no 
cause of action. Mutual Life Insurance Co. of N. Y. v. 
Phillips (Ark) 169 8. W. (2) 132. 
87: 
As stated in 7 C. J. S. (Attorney and Client) Section 
"Retraxit. The entry of a retraxit, which 
operates as a perpetual ba.r to the ,cause of action, 
must, ordinarily, be, made by plaintiff in per-
son, a.s s,tated in the title Dismissal and Non-
suit Section 5 (18 C. J. p. 1148 notes 38-42) and 
his attorney has no implied or app,arent authority 
to take such action but can do so only where he 
has been specially authorized by his client, unless 
there is a statute veSrting a party's attorney of 
record with such power." 
And Glover v. Bradley (C. C. A. 4th) 233 Fed. 721: 
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'~X or has an attorney the po,ver, exeept 
under special authority, to exPentP a retraxit or 
diselaimer, or other,YisP to bind the client by 
the surrender of his rights: for a retraxit, or dis-
claimer, or other form of a surrender, being in 
the nature of a. release, must be made by the 
party himself. Dickerson y·. Hodge, 43 N. J. Eq. 
10 .A . tl. 111; Thompson ,~. Odum 31 Ala.. 108, 68 
Am. Dec. 159; Gorham Y. Gale, 7 {~o,v. (N. Y.) 
739, 1 I Am. Dec. 549; Hallack Y. Loft, 1g. Colo. 
7 ±, 3± Pac. 568; Coates v-. Santa Fe Ry. Co., 15 
Ariz. 25, 135 Pac. 717; Turner v. Fleming, 37 
Old. 75, 130 Pac. 551, ±5 L. R. A .. (N. S.) 265, 
Ann. Cas. 1915B, 831: Forest Coal Co. v. Doo-
little, 54 \V. Va. 210, 46 S. E. 238. In Kings-
bury v. Buckner, 134 U. S. 650, 10 Sup. Ct. 638, 
33 L. Ed. 
Now, where is the special power in this authoriza.- · 
tion which vests the Switchmen' union with the authority 
effectively and conclusively to bind the plaintiff· by a 
voluntary acknowledgment that plaintiff has no valid 
claim for redress f 
The duty of an agent is the furtherance of his prin-
cipal's business; not the retarding thereof, or its aban-
donment. This is particularly true with respect to the 
relationship between a union and its members, as e-vi-
denced by the decisions in Piercy v. Louisville & N. Ry. 
Co., and supra, and System Federation No. 59 v. Lou-
isiana A. & A. Ry. Co., 119 Fed. (2) 514. 
Wbat meaning is to be assigned to the- word "dis-
pose'', in the phrase ''negotiate, adjust and disp·ose 
of"? We submit that it embraces acts similar to negot-
iation and adjustment, and none other. Certainly not 
the waiver, release or abandonment of plaintiff's rights. 
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One of the:· earliest ca.ses we find .. reflecting upon this 
matter is that of Love v. Pamplin, 21 Fed. 755, in which 
the Circuit Court for the Western District of Tennes-
s,ee was called upon to construe the meaning of the word 
''dispose'' in the phrase ''sold, leased or disposed of''. 
The court reached this conclusion: 
''The langua.ge of the p~rohibition is that the 
reservations shall not he 'sold, leased or dis-
posed of'; and although the words last used 'dis-
posed of' might seem to embrace other dispo-
sitions than those of sale and lease, yet they 
canot, upon the principal noscitur a sociis be 
extended so as to include any other than those of 
a character like those specially named.'' 
The application of this doctrine in the decided cases 
is legion. In the interests of brevity we- cite only the 
case of State v. Western Union Telegraph Co. (A_la) 
72 So. 99·: 
"The maxim 'noscitur a sociis' means that 
general and specific words which are capable of 
an analogous meaning, being associated toget-
her· take color from each other, so that the gen-
eral words are restricted to a se-nse analogous 
to that of the less general. '' 
We ·submit, accordingly, that the word ''dispose 
of"; taken in conjunction with the less genelral words, 
and particularly in conjunction with the evident pur-
pose of the authori~ation as a whole, is limited in mean-
ing by the more restricted words with which it is asso-
ciated. 
Now as to the question of estoppel, which defend-
ant ra1s.e~s as a bar to plaintiff's action. As. prelimi-
nary to this, however, is a determination of whether 
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the letter of :Jfr. :\1cDaniels to defendant justifies the 
interpretation defendant 110\Y seeks to plaee thereon, 
namely, that insofar as plaintiff is eonrt:\rned, he ack-
nowledged he had testifed falsely a.t the hearing, and 
he \Yould not further prosecute his claim for redress 
for his diseharge. The second paragraph of the letter 
states: 
~'As ag·reed during our conference, further 
action on the subject matter was to be held in 
abeyance pending our investigation of undesir-
able procedure on the part of Mr. Russell result-
ing in false testimony evidenced during formal 
investigation of August 3, 1945. '' 
All this says is that the union is investigating the 
contention that Russell testified fal~se1y. We then go 
to the next paragraph, as follows: 
''This investigation has been completed and 
it is without prejudice to our contentions and 
position as expressed in our letter of February 
15, 1946, and without estahli~shing a precedent 
as to adjustment of future griev~ances possess-
ing dissimilar facts and circumstances devol-
ving upon similar allegations 318 appear in the 
introduction of the formal investigation of 
August 3, 1945 we are withdrawing the griev-
ance and the case is closed. '' 
Here Mr. McDaniels says the investigation is com-
pleted, but is entirely silent on what conclusion was 
re.ached. Defendant says this constitutes an admission 
by plaintiff th~at plaintiff testified falsely, but how 
defendant twists the statement that the investigation is 
completed, into an acknowledgement of guilt, is not 
apparent. The lette·r goes on to say ''we are withdraw-
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ing the grievance and the case is closed", but this is· 
tied into the phr,ase that precedes it that "it is without 
prejudice to our contentions and position as expressed 
in our letter of February 15, 1g.46' '. In the letter of 
February 15, 1946, the position had been taken that 
plaintiff had been wrongfully discha/rged, and was 
entitled to redress. 
By the letter of May 14, 1946, all that is s~aid is 
that "without prejudice" to the contention that plain-
tiff had been wrongfully discharged, ·and was entitled 
to redress, ''we'' (that is the union) are withdrawing 
the grievance and the ease is closed. In other words, 
without prejudice to plaintiff's rights, we (the union) 
are withdrawing the grievance, To us, all it means 
is, that for reasons best known to the union, notice is 
given to defendant that it is withdrawing from its rep-
resentative cap~acity, and withdrawing the grievance it 
filed on his behalf, but, such withdrawal is without pre-
judice to any further action plaintiff himself might care 
to take. 
Fairly con trued the letter simply says: So far as 
the union is concerned the case is closed. So ~ar as the 
individual is concerned, our closing of the case is with-
out prejudice to him, and leaves him free to pursue 
whatever remedie,s he may have. 
In this connection it should be borne in mind that 
following plaintiff's discharge, his application for rein-
statement, and defendant's denial of ~such appli0ation 
for reinstatement and reaffirmance of the discharge 
and the ground thereof, all within the period of six 
months from the date of discharge, plaintiff's rights, 
if any he had, were fixed. He could pursue those 
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rights either before. the. Railroad Adjustment Board, 
or befort) the eourts. Before doing Pither, he eleeted 
to giYe the railroad further opportunity to revie"T hi~s 
grieYance. 
The union, ,, .. hich \Yas undertaking this latter step 
in his behalf, then ""'ithdre\Y the grieYance and closed 
the case insofar as it "~as concerned. But in so doing 
the union could not prejudice \Vhat rights plaintiff had 
by reasons of the discharge and the defendant's cate-
iorical refusal to reinstate him. Nor did the union 
attempt so to do, but on the contrary made its \vith-
draw1 of the matter upon the expre-ss conditton that 
is was '' ""'ithout prejudice'' to plaintiff's position as 
set out in his application for reinstatement dated Feb-
ruary 15, 1946. 
But defendant claims that, regardless of what the 
letter meant, it \Yas entitled to and did rely upon it a.s 
constituting an abandonment by plaintiff of his claim 
for redress, and plaintiff is now estopp·ed from pro-
secuting his claims. Before considering this matter 
further, it may be well to have in mind certain fun-
damental concepts. 
First. Estoppel cannot be founded upon an ille-
gal or invalid act. 31 C. J. S. (Estoppel) 
Section 72. 
Hence, if, as we contend, the union was without 
power or authority to surrender plaintiff's right of 
redress, its attempt so to do cannot give rise to an estop-
pel. 
Second. It is essential to an equitable estoppel 
that the person asserting the estoppel shall 
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have do:Q.e or omitted some act or changed 
his position in reliane:e upon the repres-
tations or conduct of the person sought to 
he estopped. A change of position which 
will fulfill this element of estoppel must 
be actual, substantial, and justified. 31 
C. J. S. (Estoppel) Section 72. 
How does the- defendant seek to meet this test? 
We quote from its brief, page 63: 
"The detriment lies in the fact that the 
plaintiff caused the defendant by his represen-
tations to c.ease weighing and considering the 
disposition of the claim, treating the matter as 
closed and not as an outstanding claim with, as 
it must always be considered, the possibility of 
ultimate liability.'' 
Let's analyze the situation. Defendant had dis-
charged plaintiff; plaintiff had raised the question of 
the propriety of the discharge and asked for reinstate-
ment. Defendant's superintendent had reviewed the 
case, and formally advised plaintiff of his affirmance 
of the discharge. Plaintiff's representative had then 
requested defendant to further consider the matter, 
and when it was in that sta.tus advised defendant that 
without prejudice to the claim of wrongful discharge 
it (the union) was withdrawing the grievanee. Now 
defendant says that had it not been for the withdrawal 
of the grievance it might possibly have changed its 
mind. At the outset, this f~ails. to meet the test that the 
change of position which will constitute an estoppel must 
be "actual and substantial", bec.ause all that defend-
ant will agree to is that hut for the letter it might have 
given plaintiff some faVro:vable consideration. 
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Third. The doetrine ·of estoppel is· for the protec-
tion of innorent person, aud only the inno-
cent n1ay inYokt:> it. .A. person may not asHPrt 
an estoppel for the purpose of obtaining the 
benefit of, or shielding himself from, the re-
sults of his own wrongful act. 31 C. J. S. (Es-
toppel) Section 75. 
For the purpose of considering the defense of estop- · 
pel it must be assumed that at the outset the defendant 
was the "~rong doer, and plaintiff had a claim for redress, 
of his wrongs, for otherWise the asserted defense has 
no place in these proceedings. We therefore have an 
outstanding example of a wrong-doer seeking to invoke 
the equitable doctrine of estoppel as a shield against 
the consequences of his own wrong. 
And defendant's only answer to the dilemma it thus 
finds itself in is that had the plaintiff proceeded against 
defendant immediately it might have effected some 
settlement of plaintiff's claim for redress in some man-
ner less exp·ensive to it than ultimately resulted, that 
is, by possibly reinstating him on a ''leniency basis'' or 
"on probation", or "without loss of seniority rights", 
or "with some back pay". In other word~s, had negot-
iations not been broken off, defendant might have been 
successful in effecting a compromise of plaintiff's 
claim. The ans.wer to it is that, in the first place, such 
possibilities of a compromise cannot form the basis of 
an estoppel, and, secondly, defendant never did, nor 
does it now, affirmatively assert that there was ever 
anything in the picture, so fiar as it is concerned, other 
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than that· embodied in the letter of its superintendent' 
dated January 22, 1946, wherein it reaffirmed the dis-
charge, and the propriety thereof. 
Fourth. Before an estoppel can be raised there must 
be ·Certainty to every intent, and the facts 
alleged to constitute it are not to he taken 
by argument or inference. Nothing can 
be supplied by intendment. No one 
should he denied the right to set up the 
truth unless it is in plain contradiction 
of his former all.egations or acts. If an 
act or admission is susceptible of two con-
structions, one of which is consistent with 
a right asserted by the party sought to 
be estopped, it forms no estoppel. 31 
C. J. S. (Estopp·el) Section 77. 
This case certainly does not meet the foregoing 
test. The most that could be said of Nir. McDaniels' 
letter 1s that it is ambiguous and uncertain, and a least 
as susceptionable to the construction we place thereon 
as the· contruction urged by defendant. It being sus-
ceptible to the construction we place thereon, and such 
construction being consistent with the right asserted 
by plaintiff, the letter creates no estoppel. 
One other comment with regard to the defense of 
estoppeL Counsel for defendant loosely speak of plain-
tiff's failure fo1 a period of "five years" to prosecute 
his action, and of a ''five year vacation'', well recogni-
zing that such eXJaggeration may tend to prejudice the 
plaintiff. Let's stick to the facts. Defendant admits 
the claim was still pending with it in May, 1946. This 
action was filed in May, 1949. The period is three years, 
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not five, and an exa.mi:nation of the reoord before this 
court will make apparent that the delay in bringing the 
action to immediate trial, once it \ras filPd, \Vas no more 
the fault of plaintiff than defendant. And we ea n 't 
help obserYing- at this point that "·hile the lo\\ .. er eourt 's 
judgment \vas entered Deeember ~2, 1950, that it was 
not until ~lay 23, 1951, or oYer fiye months later, that 
plaintiff's briefs were served and filed. We appreciate 
that defendant and its counsel have other matters 
requiring their attention, and make reference to it only 
for the purpose of demonstrating that there are reasons 
for delay often not apparent from the face of the record. 
POINT VII 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN 
ENTERING ITS FINDINGS OF FACTS AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND IN ENTER"" 
ING ITS JUDGMENT UPON SUCH FIND-
INGS AND CONCLUSIONS. 
Except for one matter, everything covered by this 
point has heretofore been answered in thi·s brief, and 
we will not prolong the same by making further reference 
thereto. 
The single matter that does require consideration 
hereunder relates to the applicability of Rule 55 (b) to 
the case of sickness. Such rule is as follows: 
"Yardmen taking leave of absence for a period 
in excess of ten days must secure and fill out 
form 153 so the leave will he covered as a ma.t-
ter of record. '' 
It was and is the plaintiff's contention that such 
rule has no application to an absence occasioned hy 
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sickness, ·and that a proper discharge cannot be -predi-
eated thereon in the case of an employee wh·o is absent ·_ . 
in exeess of ten days because of sickness, and who has 
not filled out such form. On the other hand, defendant 
insisted in the lower eourt, and we assume it is still 
its position, that such rule applies in the case of sick-
ness or accident or other unforseen contingency the 
same as in the case of an employee absenting himself 
for purely personal reasons. The point scarcely me-rits 
argument. How can it apply to one who is home sick 
in bed, or in the hospital suffering · from an accident? 
How may an employee who is taken sick today kn-ow 
whether his illness will be such as to necessitate his 
absence be-yond a period of ten days~ 
Defendant attempts to answer· that by saying that 
in such a case a phone call by the individual, or by some-
one on his behalf, will suffice. But such a phone call 
isn't a -c-ompliance with the rule, and one it is admitted 
that a phone call, in the case of sickness or accident, 
will suffice, then it is admitted that the rule has no appli-
cation in the case of those contingencies. 
But. even if it be conceded that a phone call should 
have been made, as defendant would have it, is the 
reco~d clear on the point that such communication by 
phone wasn't made within the ten-day period 1 The 
last day that plaintiff worked was July 21, 1945. From 
the transcript of the hearing (Exhibit "A") it appears 
that on July 31st, 1945, which was the lOth day and so 
within the period, plaintiff received a phone call from 
defendant, at which time he told defendant that he was 
sick. True, there is some discrepancy between the tran-
script of the hearing and the pleading:s, in tha.t in the 
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latter the da.te of .this phone call is referred to as being 
on August 1st, but we submit that in the light of the evi-
dence it may "!"ell be that the phone enll W'H-S 'vithin the 
ten-day period, in "~hich rase it meets eYen de.fendant 's 
theory. 
We submit, however, that a phone call isn't within 
the rule. The rule calls for 'Yritten notice on Form 153, 
and notice other than as specified doesn't meet the rule. 
On its face the rule does not, nor can it in the very 
nature of thing"~S, apply to an absence occasioned by 
sickness. 
Accordingly, the only question the court had to 
determine, other than the measure of damages, was 
whether the defendant was justified in disc.harging 
plaintiff for being absent in excess of ten days without 
having filled out Form 153. To make this determina-
tion the court had to ·construe the discharge· in the light 
of Rule 38, which required notice of the charge, a hear-
ing thereon, and guilt established. If plaintiff vio-
lated Rule 55, it was because he wasn't sick. And all 
of the evidence adduced at the hearing on the charge 
against him established that he was sick. The court 
therefore concluded, as it of necessity had to, that at 
the hearing it was established that plaintiff's absence 
was occasioned hy sickness ; that because of such sick-
ness as so established 1.\e had not violated the Rule; and 
there being no violation of the Rule the discharge pre-
dicated thereon was. wrongful. 
As this answering brief is rapidly drawing to a 
close, one or two further observation should he made 
relative to defendant's discharge of the plaintiff, and 
the legal consequences thereof. 
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Defendant maintains that Rule 55 (b) applies under 
all circumstances and violations, including sickness and 
ac.cident. Assttming, without conceding, that this ano-
maly is in fact the correct interpretation of this pro-
vision of the contract, and that plaintiff's failure to fill 
out form 153 constituted a violation thereof, the vio-
lation of the Rule still is not sufficient to justify the 
discharge under adjudicated decisions. We say this for 
two reasons; first, to justify a discharge upon the vio-
lation of the· rule, it must be shown that the violation 
was willful and intentional; and, second, to justify the 
discharge upon the violation of the rule, it must he shown 
that plaintiff knew the violation of the rule would be 
considered by the defendant as grounds for discharge. 
Now as to the first premise; that is, that plaintiff's 
violation must be willful and intentional. In the ease 
of Ehlers v. Langley, (Calif.) 237 Pac. 55 the court held: 
''Although it is not necessary that the violation 
be perverse or malicious, or that it be the result 
of an evil intent toward the master, it must be 
made clear that the thing done or omitted to be 
done was done or omitted intentionally, the rule 
being grounded on the theory that willful dis-
o hedience of specific instructions of the master, 
if such instructions be reasonable and consistent 
with the contract of employment, is a breach 
of duty-a breach of the. contract of service; 
and like any other breach of contract, of itself 
entitles the master to renounce the contract of 
employment.'' 
In Goudal v. DeM·Vlle Pictures Corp., (Calif.) 5 
Pac. (2) 433, it was held: 
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"To constitute· a refusal or failure to perform 
. tlie conditions of a contract of employment such 
as 've haYe here, there must be, dn the part of 
the actress, a willful act or willful misconduct. 
C~Iay Y. ~ e"T l'" ork ~lotion Picture Corp. 45 Cal. 
App. 396, 187 P. 785; Ehlers Y. Langley & 
~Iichaels Co. 7~ t~al. App. 21±, 237 P. 55)". 
So even thoug-h it be said that the failure of an 
incapacitated employee to secure and fill out Form 153 
covering his absence constitutes a technical violation 
of the rule, still such Yiolation, being neither willful 
nor intentional cannot be used by the employer as a 
ground for discharge. 
Second, to justify the discharg·e, it must be shown 
that the plainti~f knew that his failure to secure and 
fill out Form 153 might be used by his employer as a 
ground for dis·charge. True it is, in this case, defend-
ant proved that it had in the past used a violation of 
Rule 153 as a reason for discharge, but it did not prove, 
nor offer to prove, it had ever discharged an employee 
for violating the rule where the violation resulted from 
illness or accident. 
We submit the following cases as authority for the 
proposition that the defendant could not properly dis-
charge this employee for a violation of the rule result-
ing from illness without a showing that it had in the 
past invoked the same penalty .against other employees 
for similar violations. 
National Labor Relations Board v. Kohen-Ligon-
Folz, 128 F. (2) 502; 
National Labor Relation Board v. Weyerhouser 
Timber Co., 132 F. (2) 234; 
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National Labor Relations Board v. Viking Pump 
Co., i13 F. (2) 759; 
N~ational Labor Relations Board v. Empire W ortsed 
Mills, 129 F. {2) 688; 
National Labor Relatiqns Board v. Oregon Worster 
Mills, 96 F. (2) 193. 
Finally, as the rule itself states, the filling out of the 
form is solely to make the absence a matter of record. 
Unless, therefore, defendant has shown (and it has 
not) that in failing to have a form covering this parti-
cular absence as a matter of record it has been adversely 
affected, the purely technical violation of the rule could 
not be relied upon as a basis for discharge. Moreover, 
that the filling out of the form is merely for the record 
shows that the requirement of the rule relates only to 
voluntary absences. Imagine an emp1loyee being 
required to fill out 'a form stating in substance, "I here-
by apply for a leave of absence for the purpose of being 
sick for a. period in exc.ess of ten days''. 
The trial court, accordingly, did not err in enter-
ing findings of fact and conclusions of law as it did, nor 
in entering judgment as i~ did on such findings and 
conclusions. 
CONCLUSION 
We respec.tly submit that the judgment of the lower 
court should be affirmed 
Respeetfully submitted, 
HOWELL, STINE AND OLMSTEAD j 
CLYDE C. PATTERSON 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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